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Absract: The article revisits the debate on direct applicability and direct effect of EU international agreements 
by questioning the role of the so called gatekeepers. It considers the established role of the Court of Justice of 
the EU as the gatekeeper of the EU legal order through identifying the stages of gatekeeping and their 
implications. It further analyses the possibilities of sidelining the Court through various techniques, which 
include the agreement between the parties to the international agreement. A more controversial challenge to 
the Court’s position stems from a practice emerging from Council decisions concluding a number of 
international agreements. These decisions make a strong pronouncement on the exclusion of direct effect for 
the entire agreement. The status of such pronouncements is analysed with reference to CJEU’s jurisprudence 
as well as the relevant rules of international law.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The reception and the status of international law in domestic legal orders is a problem with which 
many modern states continue to grapple with. Similarly, in the European Union (hereinafter EU),  he 
last decade witnessed a renewed debate on the relationship between EU legal order and international 
law, not least due to the Kadi saga and Opinion 2/13.1 The openness of EU legal order to wider 
international law has been increasingly challenged.2 Certain recent cases, denying direct effect to 
such multilateral agreements as the UNCLOS and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
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1 Case C-402/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-06351; 
Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
2 See for instance Jan Klabbers, ‘Völkerrechtsfreundlich? International Law and the Union Legal Order’ in Panos 
Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2011) 95-114; Jan Klabbers, 
‘Straddling the Fence: The EU and International Law’ in Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of European Union Law (OUP 2017) 52-71, 62-63, Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the 
International Legal Order after Kadi’, (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 1. 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change,3 also raised question marks overs the EU’s commitment 
to international law and emphasised the ‘gatekeeping’ exercised by the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU).4  
 As far as international agreements are concerned, the gatekeeper role has been assumed by 
the Court in a legal vacuum. Despite the significant developments in international law propelling the 
role of the individual in terms of creation of rights and imposition of personal responsibility,5 there is 
no general rule in international law imposing an obligation on states or international organisations, 
such as the EU, to satisfy rights of individuals stemming from international treaties in domestic 
courts.6 Neither does international law establish rules on the incorporation of an international 
agreement into the domestic legal systems. These matters are decided internally on the basis of 
national constitutions or other foundational documents, or through institutional intervention. The 
original Rome Treaty and its successive revisions neither referred to the status of international 
agreements nor their effects merely stating that agreements were binding upon the EU institutions 
and Member States.7 The judicial intervention on the matter initially came through the seminal 
Haegeman judgement according to which the provisions of international agreements upon their 
ratification by the EU become part of its legal order.8 The Court broke further grounds by finding that 
international agreements can have direct effect by transposing its ‘internal’ concept of direct effect 
into its external relations.9 Established in Van Gend en Loos,10 direct effect recognised the 
justiciability of the provisions of the Rome Treaty and came to be viewed as a ‘defining characteristic 
of EU law’.11  Any provision of the Rome Treaty, which was clear, unconditional and required no 
further implementing measures was capable of direct effect.  
                                                 
3 Case C-308/06 Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057; Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others (ATAA) 
[ECR] 2011 I-13755. 
4 The term ‘gatekeeper’ is borrowed form literature; Jan Klabbers, ‘International Law in Community Law: the Law and 
Politics of Direct Effect’ (2001) 21 Yearbook of European Law 263, 296; Francis Snyder, ‘The Gatekeepers: The 
European Courts and WTO Law’ (2003) 40 CMLR 313; Marise Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence 
of the European Union: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution 
of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 215-268, 234.  
5 Robert McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and The International Legal System’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), International 
Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 280- 305.   
6 Sean D. Murphy, ‘Does International Law Obligate States to Open Their National Courts to Persons for the Invocation 
of Treaty Norms That Protect or Benefit Persons?’ in David Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty 
Enforcement: A Comparative Study (CUP 2009) 61-119, 118;  André Nollkaemper, ‘The Effects of Treaties in Domestic 
Law’ in Chrtistian J Tams et al (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties (Edward Elgar 2014) 123-150, 145.  
7 Current Art 216(2) TFEU [2012] OJ C326/47.  
8 Case 181/73 Haegeman (Haegeman II) [1974] ECR 449.  
9 Eeckhout distinguishes between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ direct effect; Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2011) 229-330.  
10 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 6. 
11 Bruno De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), 
The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 323-362, 324.   
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 The paradox of the extension of this doctrine to international agreements lies in that the 
doctrine helped to ‘define’ the EU legal order ‘in opposition to international law,12 largely due to 
reversing the presumption that international treaties were not capable of having direct effect.13 In 
simple terms, the extension of direct effect to international agreements renders their provisions 
justiciable without internal implementing measures.14 The externalisation of direct effect led to a 
graduate moulding of its rather flexible criteria on the basis of which various bilateral and multilateral 
agreements were found to have justiciable provisions, with some notorious exceptions, namely the 
persistent finding of the lack of direct effect of GATT/WTO agreements.15 Most significantly, the 
direct effect became a fixture of of a vast amount of cases involving challenges to the actions of both 
the Member States and the EU institutions in light of the commitments undertaken through EU 
international agreements. The decades of jurisprudence appeared to settle the Court’s gatekeeper or 
‘door opener’16 role. 
 The latter, however, is not set in stone. While the Court’s findings on the incorporation of 
international agreements remain largely unchallenged by other institutions, the opposite seems to be 
true in relation to direct effect. A number of recently concluded agreements, in a rather unusual 
fashion, set out the effect of their provisions themselves, leaving no choice to the CJEU and signalling 
the intention of the treaty-making institutions to take back control over the matter. In addition, the 
Council of the EU in its decisions concluding certain agreements makes strong statements on the 
exclusion of direct effect for entire agreements.17 In the past, a similar statement made in the Council 
Decision adopting the WTO Agreement, did not receive any clarification as to its status by the Court 
of Justice.18 What weight should then be accorded to these decisions? This article aims to answer this 
and other questions by revisiting the issue of who the gatekeepers are. The discussion is restricted to 
international agreements (and decisions of bodies established under the latter), and does not include 
customary international law as the trends described above are particular to international agreements 
(and by implication to bodies  mentioned above). 
 The role of the Court of Justice as the main gatekeeper to international law is considered first. 
For this purpose, the Court’s key jurisprudence on the issue of the incorporation of international 
                                                 
12 Eeckhout, (n 9), 324.  
13 Bruno de Witte, ‘The Continuous Significance of Van Gend en Loos’ in Miguel P. Maduro and Loïc Azoulai (eds), The 
Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010) 
9-15, 10.  
14 If the international agreement has been implemented through regulations or directives, then the internal rules on direct 
effect will be relevant; Dominic McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union (Longman 1997) 125. 
15 Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit [1972] ECR 1219; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973; Case C-
149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395; Case C-377/02 Van Parys v BIRB [2005] ECR I-1465; Joined Cases C-
300/98 and C-392/98 Dior [2000] ECR I-11307.  
16 Mayer as cited in Bart Van Vooren and Ramses A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law (CUP 2014) 218.  
17 See n 287, 337 below.  
18 Portugal v Council, (n 15). 
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agreements and direct effect is analysed. Next, the sidelining of the Court as a gatekeeper is 
questioned through two techniques: either through the agreement between the parties or through 
unilateral pronouncements by the Council of the EU. The article is concluded with a brief summary 
of findings. To start with, a clarification of terms used in this article is in order.  
 
II. A brief terminological clarification 
The Court’s gatekeeper role evolved primarily through its findings on the issues of the incorporation 
of international agreements in the EU legal order and the justiciability of the provisions of 
international agreements. Various terms have been used in the past to deal with these two issues.  
 While some scholars find the term self-executing treaties helpful in analysing the effects of 
EU international agreements,19 the latter never became a fixture of EU law unlike in the US legal 
order.20 The concepts of direct applicability and direct effect are the ones that are used in EU law 
most commonly even though accompanied by lack of clarity inter alia due to their interchangeable 
use both in jurisprudence and scholarship. Early on, Winter cautioned against treating these concepts 
as equivalent.21 Many have debated the linkages and correlation between the two but their 
interchangeable use has continued.22 The reason for this might be in the very fact of interchangeable 
use of these terms by the Court to denote the same notion. This lead to many commentators 
distinguishing them within the parameters of one single concept.  
 Winter himself viewed the concept of direct applicability as one relating to ‘the specific nature 
of the treaty contents’ which he advises not to confuse with the issue of incorporation, even though 
he does not object against using the term in the latter sense in the internal EU legal order.23 Cheyne 
also viewed both concepts of direct applicability and direct effect as relating to the effects of 
international agreements without necessarily separating the issue of their incorporation: direct 
applicability relates to such features of the specific provision, as clarity, precision, unconditionality 
                                                 
19 See for instance, Francesca Martines, ‘Direct Effect of International Agreements of the European Union’ (2014) 25 The 
European Journal of International Law 129; Stefan A Riesenfeld, ‘The Doctrine of Self-executing Treaties and 
Community Law’ (1973) 67 AJIL 504. 
20 Carlos M. Vázquez, ‘The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties’ (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 
695; Carlos M. Vázquez, ‘Treaties as Law of the Land: the Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties’ 
(2008) 122 Harvard Law Review 600; David Sloss, ‘United States’ in Sloss, (n 6), 504-554.  
21 JA Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law’ (1972) 
9 CMLR 425, 425.  
22  See for instance Winter, ibid; Pierre Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community 
Law’ (1983) 8 ELR 135; David Edward, ‘Direct Effect, The Separation of Powers and the Judicial Enforcement of 
Obligations’ in Scritti in onore di Guiseppe Federico Mancini (Essays in honour of Guiseppe Federico Mancini), Dott. 
A. Giuffrè Editore, 1998, Volume II, 423-443; Ilona Cheyne, ‘International Agreements and the European Community 
legal system’ (1994) ELR 581. 
23 Winter, ibid, 427, 438.  
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and lack of further implementing measures, direct effect is a narrower concept denoting the possibility 
of individuals relying on a particular provision.24 These two issues, however, are both encompassed 
within the notion of direct effect: one is part of the concept itself, the other refers to its conditions. 
Most recently, Lenaerts, writing extrajudicially, also viewed direct applicability and direct effect as 
two distinct notions: direct applicability denotes whether an international agreement requires further 
implementing measures to be deduced from the parties’ intentions, most commonly by examining the 
nature and the logic of the agreement, while direct effect is simply a quest into the provision’s 
unconditional and precise characteristics.25 Such distinction is somewhat problematic if one turns to 
Demirel considered to be the classic authority on what constitutes direct effect: 
 ‘A provision … must be directly applicable when, regard being had to its wording and the purpose and 
nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its 
implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measures’.26 
 The case sets the conditions for direct effect to include an inquiry into the nature and purpose 
of the agreement, and the provision itself to determine whether it is clear, precise and requires no 
further implementation in light of the agreement. Here, as an example of interchangeable use, direct 
applicability is applied to denote direct effect. While the Demirel definition is not without its critics,27 
the latter and the subsequent jurisprudence of the Court does not necessarily make the distinction 
between direct applicability and direct effect in a manner suggested by Lenaerts. Instead, such 
delineation is somewhat problematic in view of the Court’s practice on applying the conditions noted 
above. Even though the application of these conditions is characterised by significant flexibility 
discussed further below, such delineation fragments the concept of direct effect and is capable of 
adding further confusion. First, the analysis of the nature and the broad logic of the agreement focuses 
on a much wider range of factors than whether the agreement requires implementing measures or 
not.28 Besides, the need for further implementing measures is usually considered in relation to the 
second Demirel condition, that is whether the provision is clear, sufficiently precise and requires no 
further implementing measures, which indeed would be determined within the wider context of the 
agreement.  
  A taxonomical clarification was also done in passing by the Advocate General Sharpston in 
Brown Bear according to which the term direct applicability — corresponding to the notion of ‘self-
                                                 
24 Cheyne, (n 22), 585-588. Elsewhere Cheyne analyses the Haegeman formula in relation to the effects of international 
agreements; Ilona Cheyne, ‘Haegeman, Demirel and their Progeny’ in Alan Dashwood and Cristophe Hillion (eds), The 
General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet and Maxwell 2000) 20-41, 26.  
25 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect of International Law in the EU Legal Order’ in Inge Govaere et 
al (eds), The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Marescegau (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 45-64, 46.  
26 Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, para 14.  
27 According to Eeckhout, the definition ‘does not put in much relief the distinction between the structure and nature of 
the agreement as such, and the conditions for direct effect of specific provisions’; Eeckhout, (n 9), 337.  
28 See for instance International Fruit, (n 15); Portugal v Council, (n 15); Intertanko, (n 3); ATAA, (n 3).   
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executing treaties’ — denotes the instances where international agreements require no EU or national 
implementing legislation.29 It is not clear, however, whether the lack of the need of implementing 
measures is about the incorporation of the international agreement into the EU legal order or its effects 
in courts, which are two distinct matters.30 
 This terminological confusion even led to suggestions to dismiss the familiar terms in favour 
of new concepts such as ‘direct judicial enforceability’,31 ‘invocability’32 or ‘direct invocability’ as 
‘the capability of a legal subject to rely on (i.e. use or invoke) that norm in a particular context’.33 
However, the calls to replace the familiar terms remain unanswered, as direct applicability and direct 
effect are being continuously used. These terms, nonetheless, are well suited to denote two distinct 
but related issues: direct effect, pertaining to the justiciability of a particular provision (in its broader 
understanding),34 can be distinguished from direct applicability referring to a separate issue of 
incorporation or ‘automatic integration’ of the EU international agreements into the internal legal 
order of the EU and its Member States without the need for transposing measures.35  
 Distinguishing direct applicability from direct effect in this manner is preferable for a number 
of reasons. First, it is semantically more accurate. Second, it avoids fragmenting the concept of direct 
effect as applied by the CJEU. Finally, it is more compatible with the internal use of the term. The 
Treaty reference to regulations in Art 288 TFEU uses direct applicability not to denote its effects but 
rather the mechanism of its automatic transposition into the legal order of the Member States.36 
Transposition measures are distinct from implementing measures, as individual provisions of 
                                                 
29 Opinion of AG Sharpston,  Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia 
Slovenskej republiky (Brown Bear) [2011] ECR I–1255, para 38, footnote 19.  
30 Edward, (n 22), 426.  
31 Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘EU International Agreements through a US Lens: Different Methods of Interpretations, Tests 
and the Issue of Rights’ (2014) 39 ELR 601, 602, 607. 
32 Jean Groux and Philippe Manin, The European Communities in the International Order (European Perspectives 1985) 
118.  
33 Holdgaard uses ‘direct invocability’ in a wider sense to incorporate not only direct effect as the ability of the individual 
to rely on a particular provision, but also other legal effects of international agreements; Rass Holdgaard, External 
Relations of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal Discourses (Kluwer Law International 2008) 244.  
34 The justiciability of the norm — ‘the capacity of a norm of Union law to be applied in domestic court proceedings’, 
should be distinguished form a narrower understanding of conferral of individual rights; De Witte, Direct Effect, (n 11), 
323; Sasha Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’ (2000) 37 CMLR 1047, 1050; Sasha Prechal, ‘Direct Effect, Indirect 
Effect, Supremacy’ and the Evolving Constitution of the European Union’ in Catherine Barnard (ed), The Fundamentals 
of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional Debate (OUP 2007) 35-69, 37.  
35 Edward, (n 22), 426; Van Vooren and Wessel (n 16), 229; by analogy ‘direct application’ in Kees J. Kuilwijk, The 
European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma: Public Interest versus Individual Rights? (Nexed Editions 1996) 82-
103. 
The term ‘direct applicability’ is used also in scholarship on international law to denote the same concept; James 
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012), 58; Nollkaemper, The Effects of 
Treaties in Domestic Law, (n 6), 138-142. 
36 Art 288(1) TFEU; Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th edn, OUP 2015) 107;  
Robert Schütze, European Union Law (CUP 2015) 91; Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European 
Union Law (3rd edn, CUP 2014) 112.  
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regulations (as well as the Treaty) might require implementing measures. The Court’s case law on 
the direct effect of directives is particularly instructive in the internal distinction made between direct 
applicability and direct effect.37 Making the distinction between these two terms in the fashion 
suggested above would be most faithful to the logic, the findings and the language of Van Gend en 
Loos. At the same time, we should keep a close sight of the relationship between the two concepts. 
Direct applicability is the precondition for direct effect as international agreements have to be 
incorporated into the internal legal order prior to the consideration of their effects. The Court’s has 
played a paramount role in developing both of these notions.  
 
III. The tales of Haegeman and direct applicability of EU international 
agreements as the primary stage of judicial gatekeeping 
 
The Court of Justice's gatekeeper role was assumed first through its findings on direct applicability 
of international agreements. The latter is essentially about the binding nature of international 
agreements concluded by the EU and the EU and its Member States jointly. While in certain cases 
the EU can be bound by agreements it did not conclude or accede to,38 in the majority of the cases 
the question turns to the mechanism of incorporation of agreements concluded by the EU or the EU 
and its Member States jointly into the internal legal order of the EU. It is often with reference to the 
concepts of monism and dualism that the status and validity of international treaties in internal legal 
systems is determined. Many have been sceptical, however, about the ultimate utility of these 
concepts not only in relation to the EU, but more generally,39 since monism or dualism in their pure 
form are rather uncommon. Instead, alternative frameworks have been advanced to address the issue 
of coexistence of different legal systems.40 As the concepts of monism and dualism are not central to 
                                                 
37 Case C-41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 01337, para 12; Case C-51/76 Nederlandse Ondernemingen [1977] ECR 00113, 
para 21; Case C-148/78 Ratti [1979] ECR 01629, para 19.  
38 For instance in International Fruit, the Court found that the EC was bound by the GATT even without being a party to 
the latter; International Fruit, (n 15), para 10-18. 
39 Klabbers, International Law in Community Law, (n 4), 294-295; Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect and 
the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law’ (2008) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 397, 400; Van Vooren and Wessel, (n 16), 222; Panos Koutrakos, EU International 
Relations Law (2nd edn, Hart 2015) 257.  
40 See for instance constitutionalism and pluralism in Ramses A. Wessel, ‘Reconsidering the Relationship Between 
International and EU Law: Towards a Content-Based Approach?’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A. 
Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 7-33; Von Bogdandy, 
ibid; pluralism in Francis Snyder, The EU, the WTO and China: Legal Pluralism and International Trade Regulation 
(Hart 2010); neo-monism in Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘The Neo-Monism of the European Legal Order’ in Cannizzaro, Palchetti 
and Wessel, ibid, 35-58; communitarisation in Anne Peters, ‘The Position of International Law Within the European 
Community Legal Order’ (1997) 40 German Yearbook of International Law 9, 34-35; and Christian Tietje, ‘The Status 
of International Law in the European Legal Order: The Case of International Treaties and Non-Binding International 
  8 
the discussion that follows, they are referred to when relevant for considering the pathway to the 
Court’s gatekeeper role. 
 We start with the Haegeman story concerning the Court’s jurisprudence to interpret the 
provisions of an Association Agreement with Greece in a preliminary reference procedure. The Court 
in an apparent straightforward manner proclaimed that upon entering into force the provisions of EU 
international agreements formed part of EU legal order.41 An EU international agreement enters into 
force after its ratification according to the procedure set in the Treaty,42 currently found in Art 218 
TFEU. The Court’s reasoning was minimal and simplistic. It was based on the assertion that the 
Council decision on the conclusion of an international treaty is ‘an act of one of the institutions of the 
[Union]’,43 and therefore part of the EU legal order. This shortcut, however, left a glaring gap in the 
judgment, that is that the agreement itself is not an act of an EU institution, but rather an act of the 
EU as an organisation.44 This approach might have been driven by the determination to comply with 
the wording of Art 267 whereby the Court’s interpretative function is limited to Treaties and ‘acts of 
the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’.45 It, nonetheless, paved the way for 
conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, the reasoning was interpreted by many as an indication 
of adoption of a monist system,46 or automatic incorporation.47 Others pointed to the failure of the 
judgment to provide clarity on whether the treaty automatically becomes part of internal EU law or 
by virtue of the Council’s act.48 The phrasing used by the Court — it is the provisions of the 
international agreement, rather than the agreement itself, that become the integral part of the Union 
law — is viewed as pointing towards the possibility that it is due to the Council’s act and not by virtue 
of the agreement on its own.49 This would be indicative of dualist characteristics.  
 Another omission in Haegeman might indicate otherwise, though. The Court’s disregard for 
the nature and the form of the Council’s act (decision in the case) can be interpreted as a testimony 
                                                 
Instruments’ in Jan Wouters, André Nollkaemper and Erika de Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law: The 
Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States (TMC Asser Press 2008) 55-69, 58-59. 
41 Haegeman, (n 8), para 5.  
42 ibid; Case C-301/08 Bogiatzi [2009] ECR I-10185. 
43 Haegeman, ibid, para 3-4.  
44 Trevor C Hartley, ‘International Agreements and the Community Legal System: Some Recent Developments’ (1983) 
8 ELR 383, 391; Trevor C Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (4th edn, OUP 1998) 263; Mario 
Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU International Agreements (OUP 2013) 64. 
45 Giorgio Gaja, ‘Trends in Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint Relating to Community Agreements’ in Enzo 
Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (Kluwer Law International 2002) 117-134, 
119.  
46 Cheyne, International Agreements, (n 22) 586-587; De Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy, (n 11), 336; Allan Rosas, ‘The 
European Court of Justice and Public International Law’ in Wouters et al, (n 40), 71-85, 75; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Europe, 
America and the “Unity” of International Law’ in Wouters et al, ibid, 205-225, 222, Kuilwijk, (n 35), 101.  
47 Mendez, (n 44), 63.  
48 Klabbers, International Law in Community Law, (n 4), 264. 
49 Klabbers, ibid, 276.  
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to the latter’s insignificance. In its subsequent case law, the Court similarly did not pursue the 
apparent importance the national courts attached to the form and nature of the act approving the 
agreement.50 Besides, the emphasis put on the fact that the provisions of an international treaty 
become an integral part of EU legal order from the moment the latter enters into force also suggests 
the lesser importance of the decision.51 Various agreements were concluded both by Council 
decisions and regulations,52 fuelling assumptions that regulations are relied upon for agreements 
capable of direct effect, while decisions are used for agreements with no such effect.53 Such attempted 
distinctions, however, conflate the issues of direct applicability and direct effect.54 Only as late as in 
2010 did the Court confirm that the form of the act is of no consequence for the issue of direct effect.55 
In any event, currently Art 218 TFEU does not leave much choice: the Council ‘shall adopt a decision 
concluding the agreement’. This would have no bearing on the Haegeman findings.  
 Returning to the limited reasoning in Haegeman, why was such an important question given 
such a facile and shallow answer? Perhaps, because the case evolved around a related but a different 
question. It would be recalled that Haegeman involved a challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction to 
interpret the provisions of the EC-Greece Association Agreement. The main findings, therefore, does 
not intend to address primarily the issue of the status of international law in EU legal system or its 
doctrinal underpinnings. Rather, it is a shortcut to establish the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret the 
agreement, later extended also to decisions of bodies established under international agreements.56 
The finding on the Court’s interpretative role was paramount as ‘whoever controls the process of 
interpretation, therewith controls the truth, or at least the meaning to be given to the text subject to 
interpretation’.57 Haegeman, therefore, was the stepping stone for the Court's gatekeeper role laying 
the foundations for further stages of gatekeeping related to the effects of agreements. Most 
importantly, the case signalled a clear openness to international law, despite leaving much scope for 
                                                 
50 For instance, in Polydor the Court of Appeal of England and Wales appeared to link the issue of direct enforceability 
by individuals to the fact that the agreement was adopted by regulation; Case 270/80 Polydor [1982] ECR 329, para 10; 
Bundesfinanzhov, judgment of 5 August 1980 (1980) RIW 786 as cited in Geert A Zonnekeyn, ‘The Direct Effect of 
GATT in Community Law: from International Fruit Company to the Banana Cases’ (1996) 2 International Trade Law 
and Regulation 63, 64; Peters, (n 40), 22. 
51 Klabbers, International Law in Community Law, (n 4), 275.  
52 Gerhard Bebr, ‘Agreements Concluded by the Community and Their Possible Direct Effect: From International Fruit 
Company to Kupferberg’ (1983) 20 CMLR 35, 38-39; Riesenfeld, (n 19), 506.  
53 Iain Mcleod, Ian D. Hendry, Stephen Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities: A Manual of Law 
and Practice (Clarendon Press 1996) 81; Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, ‘Effects of International Agreements in European 
Community Law: Are the Dice Cast?’ (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1250, 1257.  
54 Groux and Manin, (n 32), 115-116.  
55 Case C-160/09 Katsivardas [2010] ECR I-4591, para 34.  
56 Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] ECR I-3461, para 8-11; Case 30/88 Greece v Commission [1989] ECR 3711, para 13.  
57 Jan Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias, Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty 
Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 17-
37, 20.  
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speculation on how exactly international agreements became part of EU law. Further clarification 
was due, although instead of answering the question how, the Court opted to answer the question why.  
 The subsequent judgment in Kupferberg has been viewed as offering a ‘sounder’ analysis of 
the issue of direct applicability.58 Building upon Haegeman, the Court adds a new rationale to the 
automatic incorporation of EU international agreements: it derives from the assumption of obligations 
by the EU and its Member States towards third countries, as well as the obligations assumed by the 
Member States towards the EU.59 An outwards and inwards-looking rationale should be distinguished 
here. The outwards-looking rationale is tied to the principle of pacta sunt servanda entrenched in the 
current Art 216(2) TFEU.60 The inwards-looking rationale, even though upholds the same principle 
of pacta sunt servanda, acknowledges the internal dynamics of the EU. Rather than being 
preoccupied with the concepts of monism and dualism, the Court’s basic concern is the 
implementation of the Union’s commitments which might depend on the Member States.61 The latter 
should not be ‘undermined by recalcitrant Member States’ and stems from ‘the perceived necessity 
of protecting the autonomy of the [Union] legal order’.62 This obligation reinforces the internal 
commitments required from the Member States based on Art 4(3) TEU on duty of cooperation 
enabling the EU to perform its obligations internationally.63 Such clarification of the nature of the 
obligations of the Member States also solidifies the Court’s ‘full control’ over the application of EU 
international agreements in line with Haegeman.64 Both Haegeman and Kupferberg, hence, can be 
seen as being concerned with the internal dynamics of the EU legal system. Kupferberg, nonetheless, 
failed to address the shortcomings of Haegeman related to the mechanism of incorporation of 
agreements. 
 Even if one interprets the cases above in favour of a monist view, it has been suggested that 
the Haegeman formula does not lead to automatic incorporation as there are certain qualifications to 
be made, including the respect for the constitutional values of the EU, and the application of this 
formula only in the areas of exclusive competence in the cases of mixed agreements.65 However, 
rather than affecting the incorporation of the agreement into the EU legal order, these factors are 
relevant for the issue of the validity, rather than the incorporation of the agreement, and as such do 
not impact the Haegeman findings. While the jury is still out on whether the EU legal order displays 
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monist or dualist features (some argue that both monist and dualist interpretations can be advanced),66 
the cases have been commonly interpreted to signal the ‘openness’ of EU law to international law. 
 Such openness had significant implications for other actors both at supranational and national 
levels. It has an exclusionary impact on other EU institutions as it allows only for ex-post assessment 
of the essence of the rules of international law.67 The ability of other institutions to adapt to 
international law is curtailed,68 albeit at the time the impact would have been greater for the Council 
than the Parliament which had limited powers in EU foreign relations. The exclusionary effect, 
however, guarantees that the application of the agreement cannot be undermined by the refusal of 
political institutions to transpose it inter internal law.69 On the other hand, even bigger losers in this 
process are the Member States as such moulding of EU legal order comes about at the expense of 
modifications to their constitutional rules on external relations.70 While direct applicability at its core 
is about ‘the transfer of a provision between [two legal] systems,’71 in this case it is instead about 
three legal orders. The findings in Haegemen and Kupferberg determined not only the relationship 
between international law and EU law, but also between international law and the national legal 
orders of the Member States.72 This has been branded as ‘Europeanisation’ of international law which 
introduces a European element to the ‘“classical” dual legal relationship international law/national 
law’ turning it into ‘a new triangular relationship, international law/EU law/national law.’73 Such 
‘indirect’ reception of international law in the legal order of the Member State,74 in combination with 
the principle of supremacy in EU law, introduced a detectable ‘openness’ in the internal legal orders 
of the Member States irrespective of their monist or dualist traditions,75 ensuring a uniformity as far 
as the supremacy of EU international agreements was concerned.76 While for Member States with 
monist legal systems, such intervention at the supranational order might not signal any drastic changes 
at first sight, for those with clear dualist features, this demonstrates a radical departure in terms of 
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guardedness towards international agreements, and introduces a bifurcation between agreements 
accepted via EU law and those concluded by the Member States through their usual procedures 
requiring transposing measures.77  
 Others, however, argue that the openness to international law is not settled with direct 
applicability solely. This is where direct effect of international agreements makes an entrance and 
takes a central stage in this debate by building upon the Haegeman findings which provided ‘a basis 
for recognising’ the direct effect of international agreements within the EU legal order.78 Indeed, 
direct effect requires prior rules settling the matter of incorporation of internal law into internal legal 
order.79 Perhaps, because the case law was not sufficiently or substantively clear on the matter of 
incorporation of international law into EU legal order, it is the concept of direct effect that has come 
to be seen as adding another layer of understanding to the position international agreements occupy 
in the EU legal order. Thus, various commentators, even though distinguishing the effects of the 
agreements from the issue of their incorporation, nonetheless interpret direct effect as a qualifying 
factor for the issue of incorporation of international treaties,80 possibly introducing a dualist element 
to this exercise.81 These views can be justified if one considers monism and dualism to be notions 
determining the relationship between different legal systems.82 More commonly, however, monism 
and dualism denote the process of the incorporation of a treaty into domestic legal order.83 From this 
perspective, caution is called for against conflating the issues of direct effect or ‘invocability of a 
                                                 
77 Mario Mendez, ‘The Enforcement of EU Agreements: Bolstering the Effectiveness of Treaty Law’ (2010) 47 CMLR 
1719, 1724.  
78 Emphasis added; Pescatore, (n 22), 173.  
79 Gerrit Betlem and André Nollkaemper, ‘Giving Effect to Public International Law and European Community Law 
before Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Practice of Consistent Interpretation’ (2003) 14 European 
Journal of International Law 569, 573. 
80 Per Bourgeois, direct effect is part of ‘a broader problem of the status of international agreements’. Klabbers notes that 
in relation to at least the early case law ‘the idea of direct effect is inescapable when thinking about the reception of 
international law in the Community legal order’. According to Eeckhout, direct effect can serve as a ‘limitation to 
integration of international law’. Van Vooren and Wessel, while noting that the issue of the status and validity (matters 
for monism/dualism) of international law should at least ‘formally’ be distinguished from the issue of direct effect, also 
perceive that the concept of direct effect as applied in the case law can cast a shadow over the monist nature of the EU 
system; Bourgeois, (n 53), 1255; Klabbers, International Law in Community Law, (n 4), 282-283; Piet Eeckhout, ‘The 
Integration of Public International Law in EU Law: Analytical and Normative Questions’ in Piet Eeckhout and Manuel 
Lopez-Escudero (eds), The European Union’s External Action in Times of Crisis (Hart 2016) 190-204, 204; Van Vooren 
and Wessel, (n 16), 218-220, 231; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities’ (1983) 20 CMLR 397, 402.  
81 See for instance Klabbers, International Law in Community Law, ibid, 292-294, 296-297; Pieter J. Kuijper and Marco 
Bronckers, ‘The WTO in the European Court of Justice’ (2005) 42 CMLR 1316, 1354; Christina Eckes, ‘International 
Law as Law of the EU: The Role of the ECJ’ in Cannizzaro, Palchetti and Wessel, (n 40), 353-377; Thomas Cottier, 
‘International Trade Law: The Impact of Justiciability and Separation of Powers in EC Law’ NCCR Trade Working Paper 
No 2009/18, 8; Antonis Antoniadis, ‘The European Union and WTO Law: A Nexus of Reactive, Coactive and Proactive 
Approaches’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 45, 83. 
82 Crawford, (n 35), 48-50; David Sloss, ‘Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis’ in Sloss, (n 
6), 1- 60, 6.  
83 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, CUP 2013) 163, 167.  
  13 
treaty provision’ with the classification of the system as monist or dualist.84 Indeed, in this latter 
sense, the rejection of direct effect does not reverse the finding that EU international agreements are 
an integral part of EU legal order.85 Neither does it affect the manner in which the Court arrived at 
that conclusion. However, rejection of direct effect can certainly cast a shadow over the exposure of 
EU law to international law.  
 In this respect, direct applicability can be seen as the initial stage of gatekeeping that is static 
in nature as the outcomes of individual cases cannot vary: all agreements concluded by the EU are 
directly applicable. The Court’s stance here can be interpreted as signalling an unconditional 
openness to international law. It is the further stages of gatekeeping, revolving around the concept of 
direct effect, that are capable of closing the proverbial gates and rendering international agreements 
toothless as far as their enforcement in national courts is concerned. 
 
IV. Judicial gatekeeping through direct effect: implications and phases 
 
The extension of the internal doctrine of direct effect to EU international agreements (including those 
concluded jointly with Member States) as a category to a wide range of agreements was seen as its 
‘second major expansion’ (alongside directives) after its extension to a vast number of Treaty 
provisions.86 Early on, the case of International Fruit demonstrated that the Court was willing to open 
the EU legal order to international law by considering the possibility of recognising direct effect, 
though denying the latter to the GATT.87 This possibility materialised in Bresciani, the first case 
positively acknowledging the direct effect of the Yaoundé Convention.88 This positive finding was 
also extended to a wide range of agreements through the course of the next decades.89  
 The recognition of direct effect in principle was a progressive development as the justiciability 
of norms of international treaties is rather the exception than the default,90 in departure from 
Pescatore’s well known remark that direct effect was ‘the normal condition of any rule of law’.91 
There has been even a suggestion that in view of proliferation of international instruments setting 
rights or remedies for individuals, the development of international law might lead towards ‘a more 
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general obligation to allow invocation of treaty norms by individuals in national courts in situations 
where the treaty contains provisions that are protective of individuals’, stimulated by the same 
considerations as those that motivated the Court of Justice in finding direct effect.92 The finding that 
international agreements are capable of direct was, thus, the next significant phase in signalling 
openness to international law. This, however, was a two-sided coin for this general finding was 
accompanied by an intricate and fluid jurisprudence allowing the Court to close the curtain at different 
sub-phases of this exercise. We shall start with the general finding of direct effect by the Court and 
its implications before turning to its sub-phases. 
 
A. The implications of granting direct effect to international agreements 
 
The extension of an internally developed legal technique to international agreements was bound to 
have political implications. While political considerations already transpire at the stage of direct 
applicability, the politics is even starker with direct effect as an ‘inherently political’ concept used for 
political purposes,93 and according the court with a political power.94 Even the arguments made to 
revisit the notion of direct effect are political in nature.95 Direct effect is said to be ‘about the 
separation of powers, and specifically about the extent of the judicial power to enforce the obligations 
of the state’.96 In the context of the EU, it is the judicial power to determine the EU’s obligations, 
namely those of its political institutions and Member States, that is at stake. While the positive finding 
of direct effect was not imperative,97 as noted above, the Court opted for granting direct effect to 
international agreements in principle. The earlier cases referred to in the previous paragraph did not 
shed much light on the reasons behind the Court’s assumption of responsibility on the matter of the 
effects of international agreements. In this respect, the already familiar to us later case of Kupferberg 
was more significant. Here, Art 21 of the EEC-Portugal Trade Agreement prohibiting discriminatory 
internal fiscal measures was found to be directly effective.98 The Court dismissed the argument 
against direct effect on the basis of the relationship between EU institutions:  
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 ‘In conformity with the principles of public international law [Union] institutions which have power 
to negotiate and conclude an agreement with a non-member country are free to agree with that country what 
effect the provisions of the agreement are to have in the internal legal order of the contracting parties. Only if 
that question has not been settled by the agreement does it fall for decision by the courts having jurisdiction in 
the matter, and in particular by the Court of Justice within the framework of its jurisdiction under the Treaty, 
in the same manner as any question of interpretation relating to the application of the agreement in the 
[Union]’.99 
 At the outset, the Court takes a step back. It does not claim to have an inherent jurisdiction to 
decide on the matter: basing its analysis on the premise of the principles of international law, the 
Court’s role would be ‘residual’100 or secondary to the agreement between the parties. The 
acknowledgement that it is the prerogative of the parties to decide is seen as homage to Danzig 
guidance in international law where the object of the agreement ‘according to the intention of the 
contracting Parties, may be the adoption by the Parties of some definite rules creating individual 
rights and obligations and enforceable by the national courts’.101 However, the Court’s argument has 
been criticised for being ‘naïve and inconsistent’ since issues related to the internal effects of 
international agreements do not have a significant part in the negotiations.102 This aspect of the 
Court’s finding is discussed further in the article. 
 Next, the Court’s analysis moves to the domain of EU law to substantiate its competence: this 
is done with reference to its jurisdiction to interpret EU law.103 Having established that international 
agreements upon their conclusion form part of EU legal order, by implication the Court’s jurisdiction 
extends to their interpretation as well. Thus, the judgment in Haegeman laid ‘the legal foundation of 
the Court’s competence in all cases where international obligations have been accepted by an act of 
the Council under treaty-concluding powers’.104 The Court’s jurisdiction to decide on the effects of 
international agreements was tied to the exclusivity of this exercise. In the name of guaranteeing the 
uniformity of EU law the Court effectively ‘monopolised’ this issue.105 One of the most forceful 
arguments in favour of this finding was put forward by Advocate General Mayras in International 
Fruit:  
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 ‘The unity and, it can be said, the very existence of [Union] law require that the Court is alone 
empowered to say, with the force of law, whether an agreement binding the [Union] or all the Member States 
is or is not [directly effective] within the territory of the [Union] and, if it is, whether or not a measure 
emanating from a [Union] institution conforms to that external agreement.’106  
 This can be linked to one of the two, at times rivalling considerations which motivated the 
Court in its finding of direct effect, that is the inclination to advance international law and its desire 
to preserve the ‘unique character’ and the autonomous legal order of the EU.107 The first would 
suggest that the very finding of the possibility of direct effect would indicate advancement of 
international law and ultimately its efficiency.108 Thus, one rationale in the opening of the gates to 
EU international treaties by according them direct effect is linked to the arguments of efficient 
enforcement of law, direct effect being one of the underlying notions of the principle of effectiveness 
in EU law,109 inter alia to mitigate the limitations of public enforcement.110 Individual reliance on 
international treaties strengthens their enforcement by adding a further element of supervision.111 The 
enforcement of international agreements through granting them direct effect is seen as an example of 
the Court of Justice’s so called ‘maximalist’ approach to the implementation of international law.112 
The Court, therefore, assumed the role of the guarantor of the application of international law in the 
EU legal order. From this perspective, the Court’s leading role was needed to guarantee not only the 
uniformity of interpretation, but also the efficiency of Union law of which the agreements formed an 
integral part of.113 
 Returning to the second consideration of preserving the ‘unique character’ and the 
autonomous legal order of the EC, vertical and horizontal dimensions can be identified to the 
institutional or power balance, that is between the EU and its Member States vertically and between 
the EU institutions horizontally. 114 The ‘door-opening’ through direct effect furthers the impact of 
direct applicability on the national legal orders of the Member States. The finding that provisions of 
agreements concluded by the EU and third countries can be invoked in national courts on the basis of 
centrally set criteria sidelines domestic constitutional arrangements pertaining to the effects of 
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international treaties with varying impact depending on the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States.115 But even for monist states, it signals a significant limitation of the powers of national courts 
since the Union concept of direct effect limits their ability to determine how far the effects of 
international agreements can reach.116 
 In this respect, the ‘Europeanisation’ of international law entails the central role of the CJEU 
not only in relation to the status, but also to the effects of ‘Europeanised’ agreements.117 In fact, it is 
the ‘centralisation’ of the issue of direct effect that is seen at times as the ‘crucial contribution’ of the 
doctrine of direct effect.118 Besides, Kupferberg was decided at a time when the Court played a 
‘dominant’ role in the EU, and in view of the relative weaknesses of the EU as an emerging external 
actor, it preferred ‘to be ‘closely guarded’ by (international) law.119 Should the Court have ruled out 
direct effect of EU international agreements, it would have clearly undermined them as a source of 
EU law. Thus, the extension of direct effect to international agreements should also be placed within 
the context of the Court’s wider findings on external relations matters in this period, including its 
paramount role in carving the external competences of the EU.120 
 At the same time, the Court was not the only institution whose profile was to be boosted by 
the finding of direct effect. By giving direct effect to international agreements, the Court in addition 
‘elevated the [EU] institutions as a whole in their power struggle with the Member States’ through 
the emphasis on the role of the Union as an international actor ‘capable of concluding treaties with 
direct effect and supremacy in the domestic legal systems of the Member States’.121 The finding of 
direct effect, hence might have been motivated by ‘the desire to provide an effective way of enforcing 
agreements against Member States’.122 Particularly in the areas of emerging EU competences, direct 
effect is seen as a means of affirming the powers of the EU vis-a-vis the Member States as ‘competing 
internal actors’.123 Another development of the doctrine should be noted here. Significantly, the Court 
also stretched its finding that EU international agreements are capable of having direct effect to 
‘mixed agreements’ which are concluded jointly by the EU and the Member States.124 This finding 
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is, of course, relevant for the parts of the agreements falling solely under EU competences. On the 
downside, while mixed agreements permit avoiding strict delimitation of competences, the possible 
finding of direct effect invites the Court to do exactly that.125 This might result in an interpretation of 
competence unfavourable to the Member States. For instance, in Demirel, the Court interpreted the 
EC-Turkey Association Agreement to conclude that the provision on free movement of workers fell 
under EU competences against the objections of the Member States.126 
 Notwithstanding the affirmation of the EU’s overall position vis-a-vis the Member States, 
through its finding of direct effect the Court also pitched itself horizontally against other EU 
institutions. While in some jurisdictions, the national constitutions might provide for direct effect 
(even though rarely),127 in all others the choice of the institution is about separation of powers as 
noted earlier.128 The judicial finding of direct effect can have implications pre and post-conclusion of 
the international agreement. It can present a potential ‘threat’ during the process of negotiations 
undermining the position and bargaining strength of other EU institutions.129 This observation is made 
particularly in relation to WTO agreements. For the majority of EU agreements though it is the post-
conclusion finding of direct effect that has a restrictive impact on institutional choices. It ‘entails a 
decisive shift of responsibility from the executive to the judiciary’ whereby the Court determines 
issues which are usually part of the responsibility of the executive.130 The legislative choices are also 
impacted due to the principle of supremacy where international agreements rank below the Treaties, 
but above secondary legislation.131 Hence, the legislation adopted subsequent to the international 
agreement cannot override the latter,132 rendering the legislature unable to compensate for the shift 
of the responsibility from the executive to the judiciary.133 
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 Despite the encroachment upon the executive and legislative powers, there are arguments in 
favour of the judicial lead on this matter. Since international agreements are part of EU law and it is 
the Court’s task to interpret EU law, ‘it would be contrary to the structure of the [EU] to leave the 
auto-interpretation of international obligations to an institution other than the Court’.134 The judiciary 
is seen as a more objective in its interpretative task in comparison with the executive,135 and is more 
mindful of upholding the rule of law.136 Nonetheless, as noted above, by assuming this role the Court 
casts itself into the political realm. The politics of the judicial gatekeeping comes across most 
prominently through the various sub-phases of what constitutes the direct effect exercise rooted in 
the setting and the application of the conditions on direct effect, as well as interpreting the directly 
effective provisions considered in turn below.  
 
B. The setting and application of the conditions for direct effect as the sub-phases 
of the direct effect exercise 
 
It was clear at the outset that any automatic transposition of an internally developed concept to EU 
international agreements would be problematic in terms of the establishing of the conditions for 
international agreements’s direct effect.137 Caution was merited due to the difference in context and 
given the political nature of the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements.138 The 
conditions set in Van Gend en Loos, that of the clarity, precision and unconditional nature of the 
provisions, would, therefore, have to be supplemented by additional conditions.139 These conditions 
did not crystallise immediately, however, and a string of early case law, including cases recognising 
direct effect lacked clarity in this regard.140 Two conditions can be deduced from Demirel, cited above. 
The first relates to the entire agreement, its nature and purpose, whereas the second focuses on a 
specific provision to establish its ‘normative intensity’ through ‘a positive test.141 The initial point of 
the Court’s flexibility is the uncertain relationship between the two conditions. Commentators even 
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diverge on the sequence of the conditions,142 which is reflective of the schizophrenic case law of the 
court, potentially changing the nature of the exercise.143 The application of the first condition will be 
addressed prior to returning to the issue of the relationship between the two conditions. 
 Even though at various times the Court deployed different terminology to denote the condition 
on the nature and logic of the agreement,144 it is essentially a ‘policy test’,145 aimed at determining 
the intentions of the parties in accordance with the principles of international law.146 While the level 
of scrutiny of the nature, logic, structure, scheme, the spirit etc, varies from case to case, the Court is 
also at liberty to imply different factors within its analysis.147 The political underpinnings of this 
condition were particularly evident in the WTO law-related case law which has been extensively 
analysed and commented upon.148 Suffice it to refer here to the factors that led to the rejection of 
direct effect and the reasons behind it. 
 
(i) The GATT and WTO saga 
 
Early cases denying direct effect to the GATT agreement did so on the basis of its such features as 
the principle of negotiations, characterised by flexibility, including the possibility of derogations and 
the special dispute settlement mechanism.149 This was criticised for being an ‘unsatisfactory legal 
test’ due to the uncertainty embedded in the idea of ‘flexibility’ as many international agreements 
would include derogations, as well as procedures for reserving conflicts.150 It is significant that these 
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early cases concerned challenges to EU law, whereby the denial of direct effect effectively meant 
ensuring the validity of the then Community acts.151 It should be noted here, that while the finding 
that international agreements are capable of direct effect signified an openness to international law, 
the Court simultaneously took a significant step in the opposite direction by linking the issue of 
validity of secondary EU law in light of obligations assumed under international agreements to the 
latter’s direct effect. The Court’s jurisprudence is seen here to be based on ‘(unspoken) assumption’ 
that EU law should be presumed to be compatible with international law.152 Despite continuos 
criticism and judicial challenges against such extension of the doctrine,153 this position is entrenched 
with no signs of reversal in sight. It can, however, be defended on the ground that invalidating EU 
legislation in actions by individuals who themselves are incapable of relying on the agreement would 
be ‘a draconian step’ hardly envisaged by the Treaties.154 The linking of legality actions to the direct 
effect of international agreements is not restricted to challenges by individuals and includes those by 
Member States which is seen as justified due to the ‘broad construction’ of the principle of direct 
effect.155 Due to this wider function of direct effect, some have suggested a wider definition for the 
latter to highlight its function as a measure for legality review.156 In this context, direct effect assumed 
an additional function to those noted earlier becoming also a means of solving the problem of 
‘collision of norms’.157 
 Such ‘collision of norms’ also took place beyond the GATT, where the direct effect of the 
WTO agreement was similarly ruled out despite the differences in GATT and WTO arrangements. 
The decisive factors for the rejection of direct effect of the WTO agreement were the centrality of 
negotiations, the dispute settlement mechanism which might have an impact on the negotiation 
position of the EU legislative and executive institutions, as well as the so called reciprocity.158 
Reciprocity raises the issue of whether the other parties to the agreement have granted direct effect.159 
This particular feature is seen as introducing ‘a clear political element’ to the matter,160 as it allows 
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determining the effect of international law vis-a-vis the position of other parties. Even though a 
stumbling block for direct effect, the Court ignored this argument as far as bilateral agreements are 
concerned.161 The Court itself acknowledges this inconsistency in Portugal v Council but justifies it 
by noting the lack of reciprocity would lead to ‘disuniform application of the WTO rules’.162 Another 
justifications for this dichotomy was proposed by Rosas whereby the lack of recognition of direct 
effect by other parties was not problematic per se, but the explicit exclusion of direct effect by them 
can be.163 Indeed, the direct effect of WTO agreement is excluded by most other members.164 Others, 
however, criticise this reasoning for belonging more to the realm of economics than law.165  
 As to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, despite its mandatory nature, the Court linked 
it to the negotiating freedom of the legislative or executive organs.166 The presence of the dispute 
settlement mechanism does not necessarily bar direct effect in non-WTO law related case law,167 and 
at times does not even merit the Court’s attention.168 However, maintaining such distinct approaches 
has become unsustainable.169 Recently, a number of trade and other agreements include dispute 
settlement mechanisms which are modelled after the WTO and are capable of ruling on WTO related 
obligations. The Court, however, will not be required to recon with its position as the matter has been 
decided by explicitly precluding direct effect as discussed further below.170 
 Most significantly, the features of the WTO rules chosen to negate direct effect demonstrate 
a political concern for the position of the EU and its institutions. The combined reasoning of the Court 
demonstrates a conscious limitation of its own role in recognition that in certain circumstances the 
obligation to comply with international agreements is a matter for the legislative and the executive 
institutions.171 In particular, it is the Council’s role as a legislator (later a co-legislator with the EP) 
and the Commission’s role as a negotiator that is at stake.172 The interests of the political institutions 
of the EU are protected not only externally, but also internally. By linking the validity of internal EU 
legislation to the conditions of direct effect, the Court guarantees the latter’s intactness retaining the 
prerogatives of the legislative. Besides, secondary EU legislation often represents an, at times 
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painstaking, institutional consensus which the Court would be unwilling to strike down. This is 
particularly the case when challenges to EU legislation are brought by the Member States: by denying 
direct effect the Member State are are being directed ‘to the place where they are supposed to exert 
their influence, through the political institutions’.173 
 The Court approach attracted much criticism. Its ‘purposive interpretation’ has been seen as 
falling short of the principles of good faith interpretation in international law.174 Despite 
acknowledging the political sensitivity entailed by granting direct effect to WTO law, Court’s 
position is also interpreted as lacking openness to international law.175 On the other hand, the denial 
of direct effect to WTO law does necessarily indicate that the Court’s case law is at odds with ‘the 
structural principles of the world trade system’.176 Moreover, the alternative could have been 
counterproductive as not only it would have failed in reforming the WTO law, but it could have also 
undermined the interests of EU producers facing increased challenges by individuals from other WTO 
members.177 The harshness of the exclusion of direct effect for WTO law was somewhat mitigated 
through he Nakajima and Fediol exceptions, which allow for challenges against the legality of EU 
secondary legislation against WTO law in case of either a clear reference or transposition.178 In 
addition, the duty of consistent interpretation, the so called indirect effect of international agreements, 
was developed to oblige the European to interpret EU secondary legislation in light of the relevant 
international agreements.179 The indirect effect is enabled precisely due to the direct applicability of 
international agreements and their ranking above the secondary legislation as mentioned earlier. 
Neither the technique of indirect effect, nor the limited application of the exceptions, however, can 
fully compensate for the exclusion of direct effect.  
 Until recently, the lack of openness characterising the GATT/WTO line of case law was seen 
as exceptional, even though it qualified for ‘a substantial part of the empirical material’ on the 
subject.180 Currently, it is safe to say that the WTO law is not exceptional in its rejection of direct 
effect on the basis of the first conditions as it had been denied to two other – notably multilateral –
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agreements. Even though in all of these cases direct effect was denied through the application of the 
first condition, the latter is applied differently in all three cases.181  
  
(ii) Intertanko and lack of direct effect of the UNCLOS 
 
Intertanko raised inter alia the issue of the validity of secondary EU legislation in light of the 
MARPOL Convention and the UNCLOS.182 While the challenge against the MARPOL Convention 
failed on a different ground, the UNCLOS was found to lack direct effect precluding the legality 
review of EU legislation. Even though direct effect is not mentioned in the case, the Court focuses on 
the nature and broad logic of the agreement,183 and it is here that the judgment ‘innovates’ by focusing 
on the issue of conferral of rights.184  Accordingly, in setting a wide regulatory regime the UNCLOS 
aims to achieve a balance between interests of various states and does not grant any individual rights 
or freedoms.  
 While the conferral of rights has been largely dormant within the case law on WTO and 
bilateral agreements,185 it is nonetheless not a complete novelty as the issue of conferral of rights 
featured within International Fruit originally.186 While some have suggested incorporating the 
conferral of rights into the analysis of direct effect,187 others view this with caution since this would 
most probably preclude the direct effect of the majority of international agreements.188 It would also 
entail the narrowing of the concept of direct effect from its wider understanding as the justiciability 
of the norm. While some praised the ‘correctness’ of Intertanko,189 others noted the lack of effort on 
the part of the Court to address any of the aspects of its reasoning which were the stumbling blocks 
for the direct effect of WTO law.190 Even if one views the WTO law as ‘a case apart’ deserving 
exceptional treatment, Intertanko unnecessarily relies on the issue of conferral rights injecting further 
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inconsistency in the case law.191 The particularly narrow view of conferral of rights adopted in the 
case has also be criticised by the proponents of incorporating this factor into the relevant analysis.192 
 Some, however, see parallels with the case law on the WTO law. Apart from the multilateral 
nature of the agreement,193 it has been suggested that, similar to WTO law, concerns about binding 
the hands of the EU executive and legislative would have played a part,194 even though the judgment 
itself avoids such reasoning. Intertanko is also seen as shifting the emphasis to the Member States to 
ensure the compliance with international law when drafting legislation.195 In both Portugal v Council 
and Intertanko, the Court’s position is seen as cautionary taking stock of ‘the structures and processes 
established by the agreement, the role played in them by the EU and its Member States, and the need 
to avoid fragmentation in the presentation of the Union interest in such international regulatory 
regimes’.196 Furthermore, some have interpreted Intertanko to suggest that the Court was protecting 
its own interests to avoid following the rulings of such a powerful international court as the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.197 If such considerations indeed played a part in the 
Court’s reasoning, then they are masked by its reliance on conferral of rights. By denying direct effect 
through the latter as part of the first condition results in a ‘general immunisation of EU norms from 
review vis-a-vis UNCLOS’,198 which would include also any subsequent norms. 
  
(iii) ATTA and the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The third instance of denying direct effect on the basis of the first conditions in ATAA concerned the 
issue of the validity of EU Directive 2008/101/EC including aviation in the EU emission trading 
scheme in light of the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Open Skies Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America.199 For the purpose of this discussion 
it is the findings on the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change that are most relevant. Even though the case is not viewed as ‘groundbreaking’ in setting any 
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new rules,200 it nevertheless introduced certain new features as far as the first condition of direct effect 
is concerned. Instead of relying on its previous case law on multilateral treaties to draw on the factors 
decisive in the ruling out of direct effect, here the Court focuses on a different issue – that of the 
flexibility of the implementation in the obligations of the parties.201  
 The flexibility relates to the manner and the speed of fulfilling the relevant obligations 
depending on the parties’ agreement. In addition to such novel element, another peculiarity in ATAA 
relates to the way the Court appears to incorporate the analysis of the second condition into the first 
one.202 In support of its reasoning on the flexibility available to the parties in terms of the manner and 
speed of meeting their obligations, the Court’s cites Art 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol which ‘cannot in 
any event be considered to be unconditional and sufficiently precise so as to confer on individuals the 
right to rely on it in legal proceedings’ contesting internal EU law.203 While the emphasis on conferral 
of rights appears to be in accord with Intertanko it nonetheless appears to blur the lines between the 
two conditions. The case therefore, does not in any way help to resolve the confusion as to whether 
direct effect requires conferral of individual rights.204 It can be argued that what the case has in 
common with the WTO law, is the deference to the political institutions of the EU which will be in 
charge of implementing the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, including via the ICAO. Another 
possible explanation for the judgment is that he Court in this manner attempted to protect a more 
developed internal EU regulations in comparison with international norms.205  
 While on the one hand a clear inconsistency emerges in the application of the first condition 
of direct effect, the position described above demonstrates the flexibility injected into its application. 
Although this might be merited in view of the necessity to make ‘various adjustments in the light of 
factors subject to constant evolution’,206 the lack of convincing reasoning as to the introduction of 
new factors undermines the coherence and the continuity of the case law.207 The flexibility in the 
application of conditions of direct effect is not restricted to the first condition solely.  
 
iv) The flexibility embedded in the application of the second condition and the reversal of conditions 
 
                                                 
200 Jed Odermatt, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union: International or Domestic Court’ (2014) 3 Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 696, 707. 
201 Air Transport Association of America and Others, (n 3), para 75-76. 
202 Koutrakos, (n 39), 260. 
203 Air Transport Association of America and Others, (n 3), para 77. 
204 Gáspár-Szilágyi, (n 31), 621-624.  
205 Ibid, 613.  
206 Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (n 39), 266. 
207 Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU International Agreements, (n 44), 246, 250, 273-281; Eeckhout, EU External 
Relations Law, (n 9), 381-383. 
  27 
The application of the second condition on clarity and unconditionality of specific provisions is also 
characterised by high level of flexibility and often leniency,208 as well as a certain subjective element 
present in its assessment.209 The leniency can manifest itself in various forms. The Court can declare 
a provision in an agreement to be unconditional and requiring no further implementation even though 
the latter is subject to recommendations by an institution established under the agreement.210 The 
Court’s lenient approach at times also surfaces in a scarce and fleeting analysis.211 Leniency is also 
apparent where the Court supports its positive findings on the second condition with past precedents 
on other types of agreements without having analysed the nature and logic of the agreement first.212 
 Furthermore, as noted above, there is also a certain flexibility in terms of the choice of which 
condition to apply first which potentially impact the nature of the exercise. In many cases, the features 
of the specific provision are analysed first whereas the first condition on the nature and the purpose 
of the agreement is given scarce attention post factum to determine in negative that it does not 
preclude direct effect.213 This approach has been criticised as being potentially counter-productive as 
ruling on the specific provision prior to establishing the purpose of the agreement would be useless 
if the purpose of the agreement is not such as to allow for direct effect.214 On the other hand, the 
reversal of the conditions’ order might suggest that the Court is predisposed to granting direct effect. 
Indeed, these line of cases characterise the Court’s approach at its most permeable with a high rate of 
success.215 In some cases, where a specific type of agreement is concerned, this approach might not 
be as controversial. For instance, due to the extensive case law on association agreements, it is 
accepted that their nature is such as to afford direct effect. Excluding direct effect for such agreements 
would be equal to ‘ignoring [their] raison d’être as the foundation for gradual integration between 
parties’.216 However, the practice of the reversal of the conditions is not restricted to the types of 
agreements which were perviously found to be directly effective.  
 A useful example in terms of the flexibility embedded in the application of the second 
condition as well as the order of the conditions is Simutenkov involving a non-discrimination clause 
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in EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).217 According to Simutenkov, as long 
as ‘clear and precise obligation’ is found which is not subject to any implementing measures, then 
the provision can be directly effective if the nature of the agreement does not preclude it.218 Jacobs 
notes that the essential issue here was whether the agreement includes provisions which can ‘directly 
govern the position of individuals’ in which case the analysis should turn to the specific features of 
the relevant provision.219 Here, it appears to be manifested through the imposition of an obligation 
despite the lack of clarity in the phrasing of the provision.220 The reversal of the order of the 
conditions, and the limited emphasis on the first condition meant the latter played only ‘a marginal 
role’ in the Court’s findings strikingly at odds with the case law on WTO law.221 In addition to the 
reversal of the order of the conditions, Simutenkov demonstrates the flexibility the Court injects into 
the application of the second condition. The principle of non-discrimination was to be implemented 
on the basis of the recommendations of the PCA Cooperation Council. In earlier Demirel, the Court 
ruled out direct effect for a provision of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement due to the measures 
to be adopted by the Association Council.222 In departure from Demirel, the Court found that the 
Cooperation Council recommendations intended solely to ‘facilitate’ the compliance with the 
principle of non-discrimination, rather than limit the immediate application of the prohibition on 
discrimination.223 
 What is remarkable is the Court’s reliance on case law related to EC-Poland Association 
Agreement where a positive finding on direct effect was made in relation to the principle of non-
discrimination.224 This is significant because the Court at that stage did not yet consider the nature 
and the purpose of the agreement, and therefore made no distinctions between the two agreements. 
Only after finding that the provision is clear, unconditional and does not require further measures, 
does the Court move to the first condition. Despite the PCA falling short of promising association, 
offering less advantageous cooperation and less ambitious objectives, the Court confirmed that the 
lack of close links similar to association does not preclude direct effect.225 Furthermore, in a circular 
motion, the Court relies here on the agreement’s general ability to govern the position of 
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individuals.226 Thus, the apparent differences in the status of the partners and their different prospects 
in forging close relations with the EU did not have much impact on the CJEU’s findings.227 Indeed, 
already the early case law on other types of agreements demonstrated that looser integration prospects 
or weaker links with the EU did not necessarily have a bearing on the finding of direct effect.228 Even 
in bilateral agreements merely providing for cooperation,229 the Court undertook a similarly 
structured analysis focusing on the second condition.230 On the one hand, this would suggest the lesser 
significance accorded to the first condition, whereby the gatekeeping here takes place predominantly 
through the application of the second condition and is of a less intense character.  
 The reversal of the conditions is not restricted to bilateral agreements only. Indeed, there is a 
suggestion that if the Court commenced its analysis with the second condition in WTO line of cases, 
the outcome might have been different.231 Nonetheless, as discussed above, other fundamental 
considerations played their part in the rejection of the direct effect of the WTO law. Besides, the 
preference for which condition to start with is itself indicative of the nature of the gatekeeping 
exercise the Court is about to undertake. The Court exercises an assessment as to whether the 
agreement in question might require a legislative and executive intervention: ‘the [Court] operates a 
sort of ex post control … closely related to the mechanism of automatic incorporation of international 
treaty into the EU legal system’.232 Besides, following this approach in case of a multilateral 
agreement will not necessarily lead to a positive outcome. In Brown Bear, the Court commenced its 
analysis of the direct effect of the Aarhus Convention with the second condition but rejected direct 
effect eventually.233 By deciding initially that the relevant provision is subject to further implementing 
measures, the Court dismisses the need for evaluating the nature and the purpose of the agreement. 
This can be seen as an open-minded gatekeeping, leaving open the possibility of finding other 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention directly effective. While this approach might raise the issue of 
the continuous relevance of the first condition, the judicial choice as to which condition to consider 
first will depend on the nature of the agreement.234 As seen in Intertanko and ATAA, the Court opts 
for commencing its analysis with the first condition depending on the agreement in question. Thus, 
the first condition is still part of the legal test, albeit a very flexible one. 
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 To sum up on the setting and the application of the conditions of direct effect, this stage of 
gatekeeping demonstrates that the Court has not bound itself to either openness or closeness, rather it 
has created a wide margin of discretion for ad hoc solutions. The Court’s flexible application of the 
conditions of direct effect demonstrates that the EU legal order can be successfully shut to such 
international agreements which are capable of impacting the interests of the EU as a political 
organisation. Such interests would pertain to the external and internal roles of EU institutions, as well 
as the intactness of secondary EU law. The more permissive approach towards bilateral agreements, 
however, does not necessarily mean ultimate openness to their ability to have an impact on 
individuals. This openness can be rebutted by the application of the second condition, where a 
negative answer leaves the international agreement toothless as far as the individual is concerned. 
Besides, even a positive finding in favour of the second condition does not guarantee a change in the 
legal position of the individual. This is due to the Court’s interpretative freedom in relation to the 
scope of the provision considered next. 
 
C. The interpretation of directly effective provisions as the final stage of 
gatekeeping 
 
Having found a provision to be directly effective, the Court’s gatekeeping culminates with the 
interpretation of the scope of a particular provision,235 save for cases where the Court directly turns 
to interpretation without establishing direct effect first.236 At this final stage, the Court ultimately 
secures or denies the impact of an international agreement on a given individual’s legal position as 
the finding of direct effect is fruitless unless the relevant provision receives a ‘favourable 
interpretation’ by the Court.237 The gatekeeping at this stage also ranges from rather sparing to strict 
attitudes. The Court relies on international law, in particular Art 31 of the Vienna Convention, to 
interpret the provisions of the agreement ‘in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.238 
 One of the main issues pertinent to the gatekeeping through interpretation is whether the 
provisions of international agreements resembling those found in the EU Treaties should be granted 
a similar interpretation. Despite establishing that provisions resembling those found in the EC Treaty 
should not necessarily be accorded with the same meaning,239 the Court, nonetheless, accorded 
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similar interpretations to international agreements in a range of cases.240 The comparative analysis of 
the context of the TFEU and other agreements had ‘considerable importance’ in the Court’s 
findings.241 On the one hand, comparing international agreements to the EC Treaty/TFEU might 
appear to be devoid of controversy as it merely represents the outcome of considering the objectives 
of each Treaty.242 On the other hand, Art 31 of the Vienna Convention ‘itself does not permit … 
comparative analysis’ between different agreements, and it is the context and the object and purpose 
of each treaty that should be separately analysed.243 It can be argued, that the comparison with the 
TFEU can indeed cast a shadow over the Court’s perception of the international agreement. 
 The most straightforward transposition of internal interpretations to provisions of 
international agreements were found in instances of direct references to the EC Treaty. For instance, 
the Yaoundé Convention, in its Art 2, directly referenced then Art 13 EC on the abolition of charges 
having equivalent effect leading to a uniform interpretation.244 Opting for a similar interpretation 
entails an ‘extension’ of the EU legal order which can be justified for agreements with an element of 
EU acquis transposition.245 However, having an element of EU acquis transposition itself does not 
guarantee similar interpretation. Neither does a promise of association always secure a homogenous 
interpretation. It is, therefore, difficult to deduce a clear and consistent pattern in the Court’s case 
law.246 Some suggest that a successful outcome would depend often on the ‘amenability’ of the 
‘scope, historical and legal context’ of the relevant agreement, while the unsuccessful outcome is tied 
to the provisions themselves, commonly on the rights of third country nationals to reside on the 
territory of the EU.247 For the seeming inconsistency between the cases with transposition of internal 
interpretation and cases denying the latter, a justification is found in the context of each agreement.248 
The focus of the interpretation, however, can hover from the context of the agreement to the provision 
itself, or the Court could put more weight on one than the other.  
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 Lack of consistency is seen most acutely in relation to association agreements with candidate 
countries: in some cases, the accession prospects were factors favouring uniform interpretation,  while 
in others, the accession factor was not given sufficient weight to influence the outcome of the 
interpretation.249 In the latter category of cases, the directly effective provisions on freedom of 
establishment and free movement of workers in certain Europe Agreements were not accorded a 
uniform interpretation with the the equivalent TFEU provisions, as a result of which the Member 
States could impose their rules on entry, stay and establishment, including their immigration rules.250 
Here, the Court chose to limit ‘its own creative reading of the association’ by granting less 
significance to the political and historical context of the relevant agreements and the parties’ 
accession intentions.251 Some viewed the Court’s approach as merely respecting the differences 
between the Europe Agreements and the Treaty and avoiding a potential backlash against the 
accession strategy.252 This in itself manifests the making of a political choice. It is expressed in 
particular in the refusal to advance the enlargement agenda and in the tribute to the Member States’ 
concerns about migration.253 Ultimately, the finding of direct effect here turned into ‘a hollow 
victory’.254 
 The comparative approach is not restricted to the TFEU. In El-Yassini, the EC-Morocco 
Agreement was compared to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement: since the former did not provide 
for a prospect of association, the scope of its non-discrimination provision was interpreted 
narrowly.255 Such comparison might be appropriate for agreements which were concluded as part of 
a regional approach, as seen in Kolpak, where the Europe Agreement with Poland was compared to 
the Europe Agreement with Slovakia to draw their similarities in relation ‘to their objectives or the 
context in which they were adopted’.256 There was, however, no such regional context in Simutenkov, 
where the Court transferred its interpretation of the non-discrimination provision from the Europe 
Agreement with Poland to the EU-Russia PCA without unpicking the distinctions between the context 
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of the two agreements,257 thus diluting the ‘differentiation’ the conclusion of distinct agreements was 
meant to signify.258 Moreover, despite the lack of comparison between the PCA and the EC Treaty,259 
the Court also relies on Bosman to transpose its internal interpretation of the principle of non-
discrimination to the PCA, without clearly demarcating the limits of such transposition.260 
 Ultimately, the Court is not an unequivocal gate-opener: despite the far-reaching implications 
of direct applicability and direct effect, the application of the conditions of direct effect provides a 
wide margin for limiting the permeability of EU law towards international agreements. Each case of 
denying direct effect or interpreting the scope of a directly effective provision to exclude particular 
right is an example of shutting the proverbial gates. Direct effect is used, in particular, as a ‘shield’ 
to protect EU institutions and legislation.261 Indeed, the application of direct effect to international 
agreements has at times been assessed as ‘less generous’262 or ‘more reserved’263 in comparison with 
internal EU legal acts. The Court’s generosity or the lack thereof has been linked to the nature of the 
action whereby challenges against Member States’s actions have a higher likelihood of success than 
those against the EU.264 As far as individual reliance on provisions of international agreements is 
concerned, it has been noted the successful cases even though constituting ‘a broad category’, 
inclusive of association agreements and trade agreements, are nonetheless the exception.265  In any 
case, it appears that other EU institutions do perceive the Court’s approach to be generous as they are 
keen to challenge the status quo. 
 
V. Sidelining the Court as the gatekeeper?:  
alternative gatekeeping techniques 
 
As noted earlier, the Court carved out its role on determining the effects of international agreements 
in the legal vacuum created by the lack of an agreement between the parties: only if the effect of the 
provisions is not settled by the parties would it ‘fall’ to the Court’s jurisdiction, as set out in 
Kupferberg.266 If the parties have come to a consensus on the effects of the agreement, the Court will 
be required to give it full effect by enforcing the intentions of the parties. At this stage the inquiry is 
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within the domain of international law.267 If such a consensus is absent, the inquiry shifts to the level 
of European law as discussed above. The main question to ask here is whether the treaty-making 
institutions can pre-empt a judicial inquiry into direct effect. Both scenarios are considered in turn 
below. 
 
A.  The agreement between the parties 
 
The agreement between the parties is viewed at times as one of the conditions for direct effect.268 
Some qualifications are in order here. If the agreement is non-existent, then there can be no talk of it 
being a condition. If there is an agreement, then it can take two forms — positive or negative, both 
creating implications for the Court’s role. If the agreement positively sets out direct effect, the Court 
is precluded from finding otherwise. Alternatively, if the agreement excludes direct effect, the Court 
cannot find to the contrary. Cheyene refers to this as ‘the pre-emptive rights of the executive 
institutions to determine whether [the agreement’s] provisions should be given [direct effect]’.269 As 
noted earlier, most commonly the issue of effects does not occupy an important role in international 
negotiations. Furthermore, in some cases an open opposition to any such prescriptions has been 
recorded. For instance any such possibility in relation to WTO law was firmly rejected by its 
members.270 
 Positive prescriptions of direct effect are extremely rare in practice. An example of such 
practice can be found in the agreement establishing the European Common Aviation Area which in 
its Art 15 obliges its parties to ‘ensure that the rights which devolve from this agreement may be 
invoked before national courts’.271 This positive setting of direct effect can be linked, perhaps, to the 
purpose of the agreement aiming to create a single aviation market between the EU and certain 
European states, non-members of the EU. Providing for direct effect in the agreement itself enables 
challenges by individual travellers and members of the aviation industry which could speed up the 
removal of barriers to movement. 
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 As for the negative exclusion of direct effect, in departure from the established view that the 
effects of the agreements are not usually part of the negotiations, examples of negative preclusion can 
be found. Until recently, they were rare. An isolated example can be found in the 1990-s in the 
Agreement on international humane trappings standards between the EU, Canada and Russia.272 In 
particular, it established that ‘[the] Agreement is not self-executing’ and requires implementation by 
each party.273 It is not clear whether the term ‘self-executing’ is used here to refer to direct 
applicability or direct effect, however, the reference to the need for implementing measures ensures 
that the conditions for direct effect will not be satisfied.274 More recently, a trend of a more systematic 
exclusion of direct effect appears to be emerging.  
 This negative preclusion can take two forms either by denying direct effect to the entire 
agreement or to its specific provisions. The first form is more extreme, examples of which, with a 
variety of formulations, can be found in recent trade agreements with Colombia and Peru,275 the 
somewhat ill-fated free trade agreement with Singapore,276 an association agreement with Central 
America,277 and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA).278 
Neither of these agreements has an ‘integrationist potential’.279 Nonetheless, as such agreements have 
been found to be directly effective in the past,280 the effect of such provisions is to remove any 
possibility of making such a finding by the Court of Justice. Excluding direct effect for an entire 
agreement would by implication extend also to the decision of the bodies established thereunder. It 
can be argued that in bilateral agreements denying direct effect in the agreement itself is more 
warranted by the EU, in particular its treaty making institutions and its Member States, since in the 
case of the other party its ordinary constitutional arrangements would apply in any case. The same 
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conclusion, however, does not stand for multilateral agreements: the other parties might also be 
interested in restricting the obligations to intergovernmental level without creating judicially 
enforceable rights for private parties.  
 In terms of the variations in formulations, it should be noted that the agreement with Colombia 
and Peru, as well as the EU-Singapore trade agreement and CETA clarify that no rights or obligations 
are created for individuals beyond those created between parties under international law. This secures 
an outcome whereby the Court of Justice can longer rule on the possible direct effect of such 
agreements. However, this does not mean that the Court’s interpretative function is surrendered. 
Presumably, the Court can still rely on indirect effect to interpret any relevant legislation in light of 
the international commitments. Unlike the agreements noted above, the Association Agreement with 
the Central American countries goes further to bar the justiciability of its provisions by private parties 
‘unless otherwise provided in that party’s domestic legislation’. Such a formulation, besides 
sidelining the Court, ensures that the control over the matter is firmly with the legislative institutions 
of the EU should they opt for conferring certain rights to individuals.  
 Examples of the second type of exclusionary practice limited to specific provisions are found 
in the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova respectively.281 The relevant 
provisions relate to the dispute settlement mechanisms, as well as the schedules of commitments in 
service laid down in annexes to the agreement. The exclusion of direct effect here is linked to WTO 
law-related content: this includes the dispute settlement mechanism based on the WTO model (with 
some adjustments) with a jurisdiction to rule on WTO-related obligations, and the schedules for 
commitments in services areas based on GATS.282 Precluding direct effect for these provisions is due 
to substantive incorporation of WTO law guaranteeing that the lack of direct effect of WTO law 
cannot be bypassed.283 As such, this practice does not aim to sideline the Court. On the contrary, it 
can be suggested that it confirms the Court’s jurisprudence. 
 At the same time, while the EU and the relevant third country have agreed to exclude the 
direct effect of specific provisions, by implication this would entail that other provisions of the 
agreement — those meeting the relevant criteria — are capable of having direct effect. As noted 
earlier, at this stage a transition is made from the domain of international law to EU law where the 
Court steps in with its ‘monopolised’ role to determine the effects of the other provisions. But what 
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if the Council decision adopting such agreements explicitly excludes the direct effect for the entire 
agreement?  
 
B. Internal institutional challenges to judicial gatekeeping 
 
Over a decade ago, doubts have been expressed over the tenability of the status quo predicting certain 
tension over the Court’s power, particularly on the part of the legislature.284 The current challenges 
against the Court’s lead role is manifested in the Council’s practice precluding direct effect in its 
decisions on the conclusion of certain international treaties. Such decisions have been viewed as one 
‘form’ or ‘way’ of excluding direct effect.285 Such examples include the decisions concluding the 
Association Agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova respectively which rule 
out direct effect for the entire agreement.286 This section aims to enquire into whether such decisions 
can indeed be seen as a means of excluding direct effect by aborting the Court’s jurisdiction.  
 As noted earlier, the international law is characterised by it permissiveness to the domestic 
legal effects of international agreements, it is the prerogative of each state to fulfil its obligations 
according to its interests.287 This implies that a state, or in this case the EU, would establish its own 
rules on the implementation and the effects of the agreement. The Council decisions concluding the 
agreement cannot be equated with constitutional rules, however. Neither are they measures 
implementing the agreement.288 What is then their effect? Can an argument be made under EU law or 
international law for giving a decisive weight to the Council’s decision? 
 
(i) The Council decisions in view of the Kupferberg formula? 
 
While the Kupferberg formula cited above made no mention of the Council’s decision adopting an 
international treaty, on an occasion the matter did come to the Court’s attention. In 1994, the 
Council’s Decision adopting the WTO Agreement included the following statement in its preamble: 
                                                 
284 Kuijper and Bronckers, (n 81), 1321.  
285 Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (n 39), 258; Semertzi, (n 279), 1129. 
286 Art. 5, Council Decision 2016/838/EU of 23 May 2016 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the 
Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member 
States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part [2016] OJ L 141/26; Art 5, Council Decision 2014/295/EU on the 
signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of 
the other part, as regards the Preamble, Article 1, and Titles I, II and VII thereof [2014] OJ L161/1; Art 5, Council 
Decision 2016/839/EU of 23 May 2016 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Association Agreement 
between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Republic of Moldova, of the other part [2016] OJ L 141/28. 
287 Schermers, (n 111), 564.  
288 Some agreements might require implementing measures, which would be adopted prior to or simultaneously with 
entering into the agreements; Mcleod, et al, (n 53), 128-129.  
  38 
the agreement is ‘not susceptible to being directly invoked in [EU] or Member States’.289 Initial 
assessments viewed it as indecisive in setting the effects of the agreement on individuals or EU 
institutions and Member States, which was a matter to decide for the Court.290 There were also 
predictions as to the decision’s potential to lead to a more cautious approach by the Court.291 The 
issue soon came to the Court’s attention in Portugal v Council.292 Advocate General Saggio in his 
opinion was unequivocal against the Council’s decision having an effect on the Court’s competence 
to rule on direct effect: it was merely a ‘policy statement’.293  
 His argument was twofold. The first stems from international law. Invoking Art 31-33 on the 
rules of interpretation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Advocate General 
ruled against a unilateral institutional declaration being seen as decisive at the level of international 
law in terms of limiting the direct effect of the agreements.294 Rather than according a primacy to 
such declaration, the issue of direct effect should be resolved through the interpretation of ‘the 
objective content of the textual provisions of the agreement’ in accordance with the rules of customary 
international law,295 including Art 31 of the Vienna Convention binding the EU.296 The latter sets the 
general rule of interpretation according to which treaties should be interpreted ‘in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose’. The second argument derives from the EU legal order. The Council cannot by 
secondary legislation limit the Court’s (or national courts’) competence to establish the effects of 
international agreements: ‘a unilateral interpretation of the agreement made in the context of an 
internal adoption procedure cannot — outside the system of reservations — limit the effects of the 
agreement itself’.297  
 The Court in turn acknowledged that it was the parties’ prerogative to establish the means of 
implementation of the agreement, however in the absence of such an accord the parties are at liberty 
to choose the means of implementation.298 Instead of clarifying the status of the Council’s decision, 
the Court, then proceeded with setting its arguments for denying direct effect to the WTO agreement 
and, only having established the latter, did it refer to the Council’s decision noting that its own finding 
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‘corresponded’ to the decision.299 First, it is clear that the Court finds the decision of relevance.300 
Second, the Court only refers to it post factum, and not as a starting premise for its findings. Third, 
there are no suggestions that the Court views the Decision as a measure implementing the agreement. 
In fact, the CJEU does not specify the capacity in which the Council’s decision was taken into 
account.  
 The Court’s approach has been interpreted differently. According to Fabri, the Council’s 
decision did not play a significant part in the outcome of the case: the negative preferences of other 
institutions cannot bind the Court in a manner that primary law would.301 Others saw the decision as 
having impacted the Court’s approach as an evidence of the intention of the EU as a party.302 Can a 
negative pronouncement in a Council decision be equated with the expression of the intention of the 
EU as a party, however? It is safe to say that the preamble of the decision demonstrates the views of 
both the Council and the Commission,303 ‘the treaty-making institutions’.304 It might be suggested 
that in dualist countries the requirement to implement the agreement eliminates the need for any such 
proclamations. In monist countries, the stance of the executive can play a part in the judicial finding 
of direct effect. Paying homage to the views of the executive, in deciding on the matter of direct effect 
forms part of the judicial inquiry into the intentions of parties in the Netherlands, for instance.305 The 
Council decisions can also be compared to the declarations by the US President and two thirds of the 
Senate on the non-self-executing nature of an international agreement. This practice has been 
criticised for its ‘neo-isolationist preferences’ depriving the judiciary from ‘contributing to the 
evolution of international practice’.306 Not only the status of such declarations in the US legal order 
is uncertain both in courts and in scholarship,307 the comparison itself is somewhat problematic.  
 First, the US declarations as to the non-self-execution are about the need for further 
implementing measures in the US domestic legal order: individuals can derive rights stemming from 
the international treaty only if the Congress passes a legislative measure.308 In contradistinction, the 
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Council’s decision merely excludes direct effect which does not necessarily imply that an 
implementing measure is required. Another consideration should also be born in mind when 
embarking upon such comparison. The US President and the Senate are the actors behind the treaty 
ratification: the US President signs it after the consent of the two thirds of the Senate. The other 
legislative chamber of the Congress, the House of Representatives, does not take part in this process. 
In the context of the EU, a principled objection can emerge towards treating the Council’s decision 
as reflective of the EU’s intention as a party for the reason of the involvement of the European 
Parliament. The latter, as a co-legislator with the Council, has seen an expansion of its involvement 
in the process of conclusion of international agreements to the extent of influencing their content or 
even rejecting them.309 As a party, the EU concludes agreements through the process established in 
Art 218 TFEU requiring the consent or consultation of the Parliament.310 When an agreement within 
its provisions excludes direct effect for its entirety or for few provisions, the Parliament’s 
participation would thus make the intention of the EU as a party complete. Would a similar conclusion 
be applicable in relation to those cases where direct effect is excluded in a Council decision only? 
What is the evidence to suggest that the Parliament would support such restrictive practices?  
 Such support could have been found in case law where the Parliament became involved to 
argue against direct effect. However, only a handful of such examples can be found,311 and the case 
law offers no systematic conclusion on the Parliament’s position on the issue of direct effect more 
generally. On the other hand, a compelling argument can be made to suggest that the Parliament in 
effect acquiesces in this type of exclusionary practice. The preambles of parliamentary resolutions 
expressing consent to the conclusion of international agreements, refer first and foremost to the 
respective draft Council decisions. The Parliament, therefore, tacitly endorses the preferences of the 
Commission and the Council. This conformism, however, might be rooted in the Parliament’s own 
disapproval of the openness to international law expressed on an occasion.  
 In its 1997 resolution on the relationship between international law, Union law and the 
constitutional law of the Member States, the Parliament called for a provision in the Treaty setting 
the process of transposition of international law into the EU legal order.312 The resolution, thus, 
focused on the issue of direct applicability. Even though the Parliament appears not to challenge the 
Court’s leading role, it nevertheless is discontent with the Court’s ‘solutions’: EU law is more 
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‘permeable’ to international law than domestic legal orders of the Member States.313 The Parliament 
evidently favoured a non-automatic transposition of agreements which should be directly applicable 
only if it ‘has been declared applicable by an internal legal act of the [EU] or after its substance has 
been transposed into [EU] legislation’.314 Even though these objections were aimed at direct 
applicability, clearly the Parliament would be interested in moulding the provisions which could be 
invoked potentially by individuals. This can be linked to the ‘democratic’ argument where such issues 
should be decided by representative institutions instead of leaving them to the fate of sporadic 
developments through individual claims.315 The Council decision, however, does not suggest any 
meaningful return of control over this issue of the conferral of rights to the Parliament as it does not 
necessarily imply any further legislative measures. This can be juxtaposed with the US practice where 
the relevant declaration turns the control to the Congress.316 In the EU, if the Council decision is to 
be upheld on its effect of barring direct effect, it should rather be viewed as returning the control to 
Member States.  
 If one is to view the Council’s decision as representative of the EU’s intentions as a party, it 
does not necessarily lead to an argument that it should prevent the Court from ruling on the matter. 
As prescribed by the Kupferberg formula, the Court’s jurisdiction to determine the effects of the 
agreement is secondary only to the agreement between the parties. The Court made no such 
reservations for the acts of the Council concluding the agreement, neither did it consider it necessary 
to give a clear weight to the Council decision in Portugal v Council, as noted above. Any suggestions 
to treat the Council’s decision as definitive on the matter of direct effect will require the Court to 
revisit its settled jurisprudence and to make a new constitutional argument to determine its own role 
and potential limitations to it. Portugal v Council, however, would suggest that by mentioning the 
Council decision within its analysis of the first condition of direct effect the Court indeed viewed it 
as relevant for establishing the intentions of the parties. Crucially, it was merely used as one of the 
factors relevant for establishing the intentions of the parties. It can also be questioned whether any 
further weight could be granted to the relevant decisions under the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
 
(ii)  Council decisions as an interpretative tool under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties? 
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At the outset, it should be noted that the Council decisions excluding direct effect would not qualify 
for a so called ‘reservation’ under Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.317 The latter defines 
reservations as ‘a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify 
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’.318 The stipulations 
on preclusion of direct effect in the Council decisions do not qualify for this definition as they are not 
aimed at excluding or otherwise modifying the legal effect of a particular agreement. Rather, they 
make a comprehensive pronouncement on the entire agreement in relation to domestic legal effects. 
So, what capacity can be accorded to such decisions?  
 According to Verwey, even though non-decisive per se, the Council’s decision can be taken 
as an ‘additional source’ for the purposes of interpreting a provision in the agreement.319 But what 
type of ‘additional source’ would it be? Returning to Art 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, this 
allows the context of the agreement to be taken into account when interpreting the treaty. According 
to Art 31(2)(b), the context, in addition to the text, the preamble and annexes, can include inter alia 
‘any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty’. While the Vienna 
Convention itself does not clarify what the ‘conclusion’ of the agreement precisely refers to, it is 
accepted that it would include instruments ratifying or expressing the parties’ ‘consent to be 
bound’.320 The Council’s decision is indeed an instrument expressing the EU’s will to be bound by a 
particular agreement. That leaves the issue of ‘acceptance’.  
 It is suggested that ‘the need for acceptance’ would distinguish the instrument envisaged in 
the provision above from ‘unilateral interpretative declarations made by a state when signing or 
ratifying’ the agreement.321 The acceptance by the other party is a condition,322 requiring the opposite 
parties at least to have ‘acquiesced in the instrument’.323 Even though the acceptance can be ‘informal’ 
or ‘tacit’, any party suggesting a particular interpretation on the basis of such extrinsic instrument 
will be required to demonstrate that other parties have accepted the position declared in the 
instrument.324 Verwey suggests that an explicit acceptance or rejection of the Council’s statements 
by the other party is not necessary referring to Bresciani, where reciprocity, that is reciprocal 
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recognition of direct effect, had no bearing on the Court’s finding of direct effect.325 However, these 
are two distinct matters. In assessing reciprocity as a factor indicative of the nature of the agreement, 
the Court is not affected by denial or recognition of direct effect by other parties (with the exception 
of the WTO case law). But when evaluating whether the Council’s decision precluding direct effect 
for an entire agreement is part of the context of the agreement under Art 31 of the Vienna Convention, 
the Court should require some form of acceptance of this exclusionary effect of the Council’s 
decision. If the Court is to view the Council’s decision as ‘any instrument’ comprising the context of 
the agreement under Art 31(2), there should be some evidence of some form of acceptance by other 
parties. Furthermore, there is no hierarchy among the sources used for interpretation: the order 
‘appears to be that of logic, proceeding from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, from the immediate to the 
remote’.326 ‘Any instrument’ referred to above is ‘extrinsic to the treaty’,327 suggesting that it cannot 
per se set aside the text of the Treaty which may well indicate in favour of direct effect. Ultimately, 
under Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention the interpretation of the agreement is undertaken on the 
basis of textual and teleological approaches in addition to the subjective quest for the intentions of 
the parties.328 
 
(iii) Taking stock 
 
The discussion above is not a matter of historical debate, but it is pertinent due to a number of Council 
decisions excluding direct effect in relation to a range of agreements, including free trade agreements 
and association agreements with neighbouring countries, as noted above. For those agreements which 
incorporate WTO law to a certain extent, precluding direct effect in the Council decision can similarly 
be interpreted as an insurance policy for not bypassing the established practice of excluding direct 
effect for WTO law. This would not appear to create any issues for those agreements which 
themselves preclude direct effect in their entirety. However, where direct effect is precluded for 
specific provisions only, or which contain no provisions about direct effect, the Council’s decision 
can be viewed as problematic. As discussed earlier, the decisions concluding the Association 
Agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova respectively rule out direct effect 
for the entire agreement, while the agreements themselves rule out direct effect for specific provisions 
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only. Unlike the Council Decision on the WTO Agreement where the relevant limitation was included 
in the preamble, in the above cases it is found among the main provisions of the decision. This might 
lead perhaps to a suggestion that a more significant weight should be attached to the latter as opposed 
to a preambular statement.329 On the other hand, in his forceful position in Portugal v Council, 
Advocate General Saggio referred to the inability of the secondary legislation to exclude the Court’s 
jurisdiction generally, without making a distinction between the relevant pronouncement being made 
in a preamble or in the text of the act. Furthermore, irrespective of the location of such limitations, 
the decisions are problematic for the following reasons. 
 First, as noted above, these agreements themselves preclude direct effect for specific 
provisions implying that other provisions are capable of direct effect. In this context, it can even be 
suggested that the Council decisions are against the intentions of ‘the parties’. Second, such unilateral 
declarations by the Council, outside of the WTO law, are at odds with the past jurisprudence, 
especially if the agreement contains provisions identical to those which were found to be directly 
effective in the past in cases of comparable bilateral agreements.330 Van der Loo et al note in this 
connection Art 17 in EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on the principle of non-discrimination in 
relation to workers.331 Similar provisions in Association Agreements with EU neighbouring countries 
in the South were found to be capable of direct effect in the past.332 Besides, this provision is identical 
to the non-discrimination provision in EU-Russia PCA in Simutenkov.333  As discussed earlier, the 
Court in its analysis of the condition on the nature and the logic of the agreement embraces a 
comparative approach. The PCA with Russia offers much narrower integration prospects vis-a-vis 
the Association Agreement with Ukraine.334 The Ukrainian agreement is ‘the most advanced 
agreement of its kind ever negotiated by the [EU],335 offering the closest possible links to the EU 
falling short of membership, which has also served as a template for the respective agreements with 
Georgia and Moldova. In this light, the Council’s decision indeed appears to signal a clear preference 
for a departure from past case law. It might be suggested that it is perhaps due to the integrationist 
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agenda of such agreements that the Council felt compelled to restrict their direct effect. Ukraine, 
Georgian and Moldova entertain European aspirations and view these agreements as a stepping stone 
in their future membership path. By denying direct effect to these Agreements, the Council sends a 
clear signal that they remain at an intergovernmental level falling short of creating a union of people. 
But this cannot be the sole logic driving the Council to exclude direct effect for EU bilateral 
agreements. A similar decision precluding direct effect was adopted for the EU-Korea free trade 
agreement.336 The latter cannot be compared to the Association Agreements noted above and contains 
no similar integrationist agenda. It might, hence, indicate towards a general trend of restricting direct 
effect for agreements which were found to be directly effective in the past. The EU-Korea agreement, 
for instance, contains standstill provisions which could be directly effective as seen in earlier 
jurisprudence.337 The Council decisions, therefore, signal a manifest preference for a departure from 
the Court’s practice.  
 It might be a matter of time before the CJEU is called to clarify the status of such 
pronouncements by the Council. In particular, a clarification will need to be made whether excluding 
direct effect in a provision of the decision gives the latter more legal weight than a preambular 
statement as in the WTO Decision so as to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction. Alternatively, if the Court 
maintains the Kupferberg formula, it should interpret international treaties by giving ordinary 
meaning to their terms which might indicate in favour of direct effect according to the conditions set 
by the Court. If the Council is to insist that its decision should be viewed as part of the context of the 
agreement, then some form of ‘acceptance’ on behalf of other parties should be demonstrated.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
The Court of Justice has meticulously carved outs its role of a gatekeeper, which is not one of an 
unequivocal ‘door opener’. The Haegeman ruling establishing the direct applicability of international 
treaties signalled an almost automatic openness to international law. It laid the foundations for the 
next opening act which is the general finding that intentional agreements are capable of having direct 
effect. Paradoxically, these developments were affected more by internal considerations than 
external. Apart from affirming the crucial role of the Court of Justice in EU international relations 
vis-a-vis other institutions, they also propelled the EU’s external actorness against the Member States.  
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 The Court, having placed itself at the core of the direct effect exercise, became a flexible 
gatekeeper. The manner in which the conditions of direct effect have been set and applied allowed 
for ample scope for both generous and ungenerous findings. Ridden with inconsistency, the setting 
and the application of the conditions of direct effect permitted the Court to limit the extent to which 
international agreements could empower individuals or affect the legality of secondary EU 
legislation, in particular when the external or internal interests of the EU institutions were at stake. 
The CJEUs flexibility has been carried forward to the last phase of gatekeeping through the 
interpretation of the provisions of the agreement ultimately determining whether the individual would 
find the relief sought. Here, additional concerns – those of Member States – can also be taken into 
account.  
 The reign of the Court is being challenged though. While challenges to direct applicability 
expressed by the Parliament in its 1997 resolution did not lead to any consequences, the Council and 
the Commission are willing to mitigate the openness created by direct applicability through 
limitations to direct effect. The dual practice of excluding direct effect either for the entire agreement 
or for specific provisions reveal the ease with which the Court can be sidelined. The situation is less 
clear with the Council’s attempt to exclude direct effect for entire agreements in its decisions on their 
adoption. Despite mentioning the exclusionary preambular pronouncement in the Council’s 1994 
decision in Portugal v Council in support of its rejection of the direct effect of the WTO agreement, 
the Court failed to clarify the weight it attached to the latter.  
 In the recent decisions, the Council makes a stronger statement by relocating the exclusion of 
direct effect to the text of the decision from the preamble. If the issue of direct effect of any of these 
agreements is ever raised, the Court will be called to revisit its gatekeeper role and the possible 
concessions to it. The Court will have to clarify whether the decisions can be viewed as expressing 
the intention of the EU as a party, and, if so, whether it would be capable of setting the Court’s 
jurisdiction aside. Unless the Kupferberg formula is revised, Portugal v Council suggests that the 
Court would interpret the international agreement, i.e. would preserve its jurisdiction over the matter 
of direct effect, but would, nonetheless, take into account the Council’s decision as part of its analysis 
of the first condition of direct effect. The status of the pronouncements by the Council can also be 
clarified under international law. It is only a matter of time before this issue is raised in front of the 
Court.  
 
 
